This piece was published  on  CHINA-US FOCUS on September 11, 2017. Here is the version before being editted. 

 

Diplomacy toward South Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative

 

Xue Li (Institute of World Economics and Politics, CASS)

 

Zheng Haiqi(School of International Studies, Renmin University of China)

 

Under “the Belt and Road” Initiative(BRI), neighboring diplomacy is bound to be a priority of China’s diplomacy. Therefore, this essay advocates that China should develop neighboring diplomatic strategy and expounds some principles: dividing neighboring region into several sub-regions and classifying neighboring states in accordance with the size. Corresponding foreign policy needed to be formulated which includes maintaining proper contacts with sub regional powers but focusing on supporting sub-regional middle states to make them become pivot in the region, and taking certain small states into account at the same time. China’s attitude is determined by levels of enthusiasm of host countries on “The Belt and Road”. (See 《世界知识》World Affairs, No. 5, 2017) Then how should we apply it specificly to South Asia?

 

Of the eight member states in South Asian Association for regional cooperation(SAARC), India is undoubtedly the sub-regional power, while Pakistan and Bangladesh are both sub-regional middle states with their population over 100 million. The remaining five states are sub-regional small states, of which Bhutan and Maldives are micro-states. From levels of enthusiasm on “The Belt and Road”, Pakistan is undoubtedly the most, followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, to which Nepal, Maldives and Afghanistan are inferior, while India and Bhutan are both the least enthusiastic.

 

With large number states involving in “The Belt and Road”, the majority are developing countries. Their investment environment is worse than developed countries on the whole, as well as cultural exchanges, infrastructure construction and so forth relying on cooperation among governments. Consequently, to a large extent, the official attitudes of host countries toward “The 锚点Belt and Road” will determine the attitude of Chinese government, and the strength of “The Belt and Road” construction in these states which promoted by China. Pakistan has spent decades on proving that a friendly policy to China will all be pursed no matter which party or personage comes into power, which is not a usual phenomenon around China. Pakistan, which is not a sub-regional power, is faced with strategic pressure from India but has a large population and a strong desire to develop economy. These factors have promoted Chinese government to set China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as the flagship project of “The Belt and Road” construction. There is no doubt that this decision is rational enough. As for whether the scale of investment is too large, the speed is too fast or the project has economic benefits and so on, these factors are all relatively subordinate and need to be gradually adjusted in the process of implementation.

 

Though the enthusiasm of Bangladesh on BRI is no less than Pakistan, it doesn’t dare to implement the similar lopsided policy to China. Instead, it wishes to take “work more and talk less” model in cooperation with China. China certainly understands Bangladesh’s standpoint and is aware that Bangladesh possesses a large population, a strong determination for industrialization, a generally stable political situation and a security environment better than Pakistan. Therefore, as the investment in Bangladesh increases steadily year by year, Bangladesh is very likely to become another “tight buddy” of China like Pakistan, especially in terms of economic cooperation.

 

Sri Lanka during Rajapaksa administration (December 2005 - January 2015) has pursued highly friendly foreign policy toward China, and thus becomes the focus state cooperating with China in South Asia. The breadth and depth of cooperation in economy, culture and security is even more than Bangladesh. The relations between China and Sri Lanka have experienced a period of low ebb since Maithripala Sirisena came to power. Though roughly restored now, it’s very difficult to reach the level of Rajapaksa administration. What is worth mentioning is that Rajapaksa’s attitude towards Hambantota port project of his hometown has shifted from vigorously promotion in office to non-support or even opposition after he left the presidency.

 

Afghanistan is far from economic reconstruction. The main task is to achieve political stability and security improvement. Afghan government can’t even guarantee the necessary security for Chinese enterprises, as it can only control Kabul and its limited surrounding areas. Thus, it’s very difficult to convince China to regard Afghanistan as the focus country in “The Belt and Road” construction in South Asia. China, US and Afghanistan all wish China to play a greater role in Afghan peace process and reconstruction. But China can actually play a very limited role, which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

 

The diplomatic policies (especially policies towards China) of Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal's foreign policy, is severely constrained by New Delhi. This is vividly illustrated in Sino-India Doklam stand-off which has lasted for more than two months and just ended on August 28, 2017.

 

India opposes CPEC for territorial sovereignty excuse, rejects BCIM for national security reason and is also vigilant of Sino-Nepal-India Economic Corridor. Besides, India launches Spice Route and Project Mausam to off-set BRI. India not only demonstrates its indifference, but suppresses other South Asian states participating in BRI construction.

 

Based on the above analysis, what kind of regional strategy should China implement in South Asia?

 

First, it is necessary to take engagement policy on India, which is better than non-contact or confrontation. Cooperation around specific projects in economic domain can still be promoted, and the possibility of CPEC extending to India can be explored. There is a potential bright spot in cultural domain: that is to connect the holy Lands, the holy Mountains and the holy Lakes of Buddhism and Hinduism distributed in Tibet, Nepal and Northern India, aiming to build Sino-Nepal-India Cultural Corridor and provide new paradigm for the coexistence and Co-prosperity of ancient civilizations in Asia.

 

Second, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka can be regarded as key cooperation targets in South Asia and shaped as different types of pivot states, which is critical content of the South Asian strategy.

 

Finally, as a long-term strategic concept, “sustainability” is more important than “short-term effect” in BRI. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize more on the quality of cooperative projects and reduce appropriately the emphasis on quantity and speed. This applies to any host country.

 

The published version：https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-belt-and-road-is-coming-to-south-asia-but-not-everyone-is-enthusiastic.