What Kind of South China Sea Does China Need?

XUE Li

(Professor, Institute of World Economics and Politics, CASS)

CHENG  Zhangxi

(PHD. University of St Andrews)

The United States Navy Destroyer –USS Dewey (DDG 105) sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands) on 24May 2017, conducting the so-called freedom of navigation operations(FONOPs). It stayed there for one and a half hours and practiced Drowning Personnel Rescue. In addition to domestic factors of the United States, other reasons behind this act of the USS Dewey include: to promote an international conception that the Mischief Reef is not an island, to avoid objectively acknowledge China's sovereignty over the Mischief Reef, to challenge China's sovereignty claims over SCS, to protect the United States Navy's vital interests,and so forth. Which, obviously, make it not an Innocent Passage. 

This is the first time since president Donald Trump took office, and under a background where China and the United States are gradually warming up ties after the Mar-a-Lago Resort meeting and taking bilateral collaboration in terms of some hotspot issues at times. It will definitely be repeated. The Defence Secretary James Mattis has already confirmed this during the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore on 5 June 2017,  and then another FONOP was conducted within 12 nautical miles of the Zhongjian(Triton) Island in Xisha(Paracel) Islands on July 2,2017. FONOPs may well be further upgraded to Harmful Passage. Then what should China do? Continue on the current approach? introduce a comprehensive response after careful calculation? and even take the big stick out when necessary?

An Analysis of China's South China Sea Stand

How China should deal with the South China Sea(SCS) issue? It mainly depends on how China view SCS: Internal Waters? Territorial Sea? Territorial Sea plus Exclusive Economic Zones? Territorial Waters plus Exclusive Economic Zones (including Continental Shelf) plus High Sea? Archipelagic Waters? High Sea?

Identifying the South China Sea as Territorial Waters plus Exclusive Economic Zones (including Continental Shelf) plus High Sea is in line with China's stand. China states that, "China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters, as well as sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant seabed and subsoil" (see the notes submitted by China to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 7May 2009 and 14 April 2011, file number CML/17/2009 and CML/8/2011, respectively),"China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands (the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands) and the adjacent waters" (see the Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines published on 7 December 2014),"China’s sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao and relevant rights and interests in the South China Sea have been established in the long course of history, and are solidly grounded in history and law", "China has, based on Nanhai Zhudao, internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. In addition, China has historic rights in the South China Sea" (see the White Paper published by the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of Chinaon 13 July 2016 entitledChina Adheres to the Position of Settling through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea).

Nevertheless, neither has China clearly defined the extent of Surrounding Waters and Relevant Waters, nor has it clarified the specifics of the South China Sea Dotted Line or published its geographic coordinates. China deems that there are no disputes over the island and reef ownerships and maritime rights in the Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands) and Zhongsha Islands, but admits there are disputes of such over the Nansha Islands(the Spratly Islands).  

Maritime delimitation can only be carried out after determining the ownerships of islands and reefs.And so far, mainland China, China’s Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have all taken control of some of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. As is well-known, splitting the difference is the only way to a peaceful solution to the South China Sea issue. It is more than difficult to ask any claimant to fully give in their controlling islands and reefs. Should an un-peaceful way of sorting out the South China Sea issue be decided, the importance of the South China Sea in the whole of China's national interests must be thoroughly measured, as well as the cost to such a solution. If core interest, major interest, general interest and secondary interest are regarded as brain, arm, finger and hair to the human body, then only core interest is not negotiable, but all the rest can be conceded or traded for greater interests,given that one country can only put in so much for non-core interests.

One's land can often be divided into two categories: the 'core part' and the 'marginal part'. Of which continental soil, key islands, ports and forts that are located in the outlying areas are also regarded as the 'core part'. In the case of China, XinJiang, Tibet and Taiwan are in no doubt the 'core part',the islands and reefs in the South China Sea on the other hand, are not so important. That is to say, their importance are much less than 'brain'. In this thinking, it is not necessary for China to put in a fight against a multinational force headed by the United States for the South China Sea. But what about a regional battle, for instance, to launch a quick strike to re-gain control of 42 islands and reefs occupied by the ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea,and then make an immediate truce?

The Dispute of the South China Sea Issue and China's Rise

China should see the long-term influences of war and carefully evaluate necessity of war. The key to grasp the South China Sea issue is to acknowledge that it is a strategic issue first, a political issue second, and a legitimacy issue last. When dealing with SCS issue, China should go far beyond SCS. In other words, China should not only consider how to maximise its own interests in SCS, but how to advance China's rise as a comprehensive global power. This means that China has to consider the South China Sea issue with a comprehensive mind, contemplating the following questions: Which is more important, the building of One Belt and One Road(OBOR) or the disputes over SCS? How to strike a balance between "building a regional strategic support belt" and "safeguarding the sovereignty and maritime rights of SCS"? How to give consideration to both global maritime interests and South China Sea interests? How to coordinate the maritime claims of the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, and make the South China Sea issue a support to the settlement of the Taiwan issue? How to put the South China Sea issue in the China-ASEAN relations?

1. Which is more important, the building of OBOR or the disputes over SCS?

OBOR is a top-level design of foreign relations determined by current Chinese government and a long-term strategic planning. In this sense, the politics, diplomatic responses, and the legal instruments and so forth employed in resolving the South China Sea issue should all be serving OBOR. For the time being, SCS issue is in a relatively peaceful period. However, it is nonetheless a major concern to the regional security and stability, a tool to the United States' "regional re-balancing strategy", as well as factually affecting the implementation of OBOR (especially the Maritime Silk Road) in the ASEAN countries, in particular the ASEAN claimants. For this reason, China's South China Sea policy should steer from pursuing unilateral win to multilateral win, and attempt to bring forth a multilateral winning plan and to take lead in the problem solving process. The next few years are a time window for China to establish a new South China Sea policy(I have articulated it in another piece)

2.How to strike a balance between "building a regional strategic support belt" and "safeguardingthe sovereignty and maritime rights of the South China Sea"?

To choose a few pivot countries around China to build a regional strategic support belt is an important step in China's way to a comprehensive global power.In the view of global strategic collaboration, Russia is a pivot country.From the angle of opening to the West and building the EurasiaLand Bridge, Kazakhstan may be a pivot one. From the standpoint of comprehensive cooperation, Pakistan, Cambodia and Laos are pivot ones. And in thinking of technology introduction and industrial upgrade, South Korea could be a pivot one. And then from the perspective of economic cooperation potential, including building the Maritime Silk Road hub, as well as constructing a multilateral cooperation platform, Southeast Asian countries are definitely the key choices, and of which, Thailand, Malaysia are most likely to become pivot countries. Although what has to be pointed out here is that the South China Sea issue, which is broadly regarded as an indicator to China's foreign policies, is still one of the most concerned regional security questions to the Southeast Asian countries.

China being the largest coastal country along SCS, the other claimants are no match for China’s capacity in resolving the South China Sea issue. If China could come up with a multilateral winning plan that not only concerns its own interests, but also take into consideration of other claimants' concerns, then the security concerns to the ASEAN countries, especially the ASEAN claimants will be much lessened, as well as their following security reliance on the other outside countries. Meanwhile, other neighbouring countries should also to some extent have an increase in their trust in China.

It is not rare to find that the rise of a country causes security concerns to its neighbouring countries. In this process, gaining their favour is a compulsory task.In order to achieve as such, the rising country has to lessen its neighbouring countries' security concerns and build up their trust. However, considering China's responses to the South China Sea issue since 2009, this outcome is barely achieved. In contrast, whilst China's exercise in self-restraint is largely overlooked, the outside world is mainly focused on China's moves in safeguarding its rights, and describes these moves as "assertive". After Taiwan weakened its "historical waters" claim and Vietnam given up its "historical rights" claim, mainland China became the only claimant left who insists on "historical rights" to the South China Sea, and a lack of specifics to this claim have brought China many accusations and criticisms. To "force China to clarify its SCS claim" has already become one of the priorities of the United States' SCS strategy, and this has won numerous supports from a number ofASEAN countries.

3. How to give consideration to both global maritime interests and SCS interests?

Overseas interest is quickly expanding, maritime interest is rapidly increasing, and a great blue water Navy is in the making – China's path to a comprehensive global power cannot be without the support of maritime rights and interests. The most significant difference between land and sea is that the land's exclusiveness and the sea's openness. In an open environment, better utilisation of sea is a distinctive sign of maritime power, who shall by all means pursue bigger extent of high sea, and limit the coastal countries' privileges of EEZ and territorial waters. This means that China's maritime claims should maximise its interests not only in coastal waters but also in global waters. Hence, China's maritime claims have to be universally applicable, so as to make China one of the main builders and leaders of the global maritime manegement institution, and maximise its maritime interests in global waters.

In dealing with SCS issue, at the macro level, China needs to balance the rights and interests claims made in between the South China Sea and other seas, whereas at the micro level, China should neither put too much emphasis on limiting other countries' right to conduct military operations in China's EEZ nor seeking “abundant area to act” for its strategic nuclear submarines.

4. How to make a similar maritime claims of the East China Sea, SCS and the Yellow Sea, and make SCS issue helpful for the settlement of the Taiwan issue?

At present, China's maritime claims have not been made clear enough. In regard to the Yellow Sea, China is stressing on the International Law and especially the equity principle. With a view to the East China Sea, China advocates the international law and puts a stress on the principle of natural extension of the continental shelf. In respect to SCS, China is emphasising on the application of both international law and historical rights. This is not a suitable position for an emerging power. South Korea believes that a medium line reflects fairness, so what does China's fairness entail? Japan believes that the Okinawa Trough is not the end of the continental shelf, but accidental geographical depression, and what is China's scientific response to Japan's view?Historic rights have already been existing for more than one generation, is it possible to reach some clarification with the help of global wisdom. This will significantly promote the settlement of the maritime disputes, resolve the tension between different claims, and lessen the doubts of the outside world.

A more realistic approach, which should guideline the direction of China's new maritime policy is:to have the Yellow Sea claim based on the adjusted medium line, the East China Sea claim based on the combination of the medium line and the continental shelf, and the South China Sea claim based on international law and a clarified historic right.

In comparison to the disputes over the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, the dispute over SCS gives China more advantage. The progress made in such can also help resolving the disputes over the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea and even the Taiwan issue. The key to this is that how the current Chinese leader to promote SCS problem solving process.

As for China, the Taiwan issue is in no doubt more important than SCS issue, the East China Sea issue and the DPRK nuclear issue. But since not much can be done in the East China Sea issue and the DPRK nuclear issue, SCS issue becomes the option to act and its urgency becomes increasingly clear. Taking into account the intervention of the outside countries especially the United States and Japan on SCS issue, and Tsai Ing-wen's deep-rooted preference for "Taiwan’s independence", in dealing with the SCS issue, China has no choice but to consider how to 'pull' the ASEAN countries close,to prevent the East China Sea issue from being linked with SCS issue, and not to “add a burden” to Taiwan issue.

5. How to put SCS issue in the China-ASEAN relations?

In dealing with the South China Sea issue, the ASEAN countries, in particular the ASEAN claimants are more focused on "controlling differences" whilst China is more concerned about "strengthening cooperation". To this end, the ASEAN claimants voice to draw up the 'SCS Code of Conduct' (COC)as soon as possible. China, whilst deeming the settlement of SCS issue a long-term process and COC unable to eliminate the dispute, introduced the "dual-track approach" and agreed to relatively speed up the drafting of COC framework. As a result, a framework document of COC was finally signed by China and the ASEAN countries on 18 May 2017. Yet, this document "only involves the relevant elements, but lacks specifications". Remaining issues such as whether COC is legally binding, which maritime areas are applicable, whether a dispute settlement mechanism should be established and so forth are still left for further discussion.

If there is no breakthrough in the issues most concerned to the ASEAN countries, the effectiveness of COC will be significantly affected, and will led them to firmly believe that China is reluctant to be in a framework of a strong legally binding multilateral institution. Further unilateral actions may also be a possibility depending on China’s capacities. In that case, the ASEAN countries are highly likely to strengthen security cooperation with outside countries especially the United States, their economic and security cooperation with China on the other hand, will then be affected. It is in this thinking, China at this stage must consider the option to enter a legally binding multilateral framework, and promote the problem solving process of SCS issue within this framework, as well as implement OBOR.

Concluding Remarks

As a rising great power, China should examine SCS issue from a global stand, so as to bring forward a new SCS policy that serves the primary objective of China becoming a comprehensive global power. With this new policy, China should be more upper-handed when dealing with SCS issue – to the ASEAN countries, China could be more flexible gaining their interests and trusts, as well as lessen their security concerns; to the United States’ FONOPs, China should dare to confront with.

At the very least, from 27 October 2015 when the United States Navy Destroyer - USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Subi Reef in Nansha Islands, the United States’ FONOPs has already made itself a primary source to a periodical tension to SCS. China's response is to send a warship to "identify and verify,warn and expel",which is exactly what it did to the USS Dewey. This is obviously far from enough, and could very well result in the United States taking a yard when given an inch. In dealing with so-called FONOPs with 12 nautical miles, China must show its determination and will clearly to the United States that: your act is definitely a violation to the Chinese laws and a humiliation to a rising power. A mature superpower should not behave that way.

https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/what-kind-of-south-china-sea-does-china-need