A Conception for China’s Neighboring Diplomacy (under OBOR Strategy)

By Xue Li from CASS  and

Zheng Yuwen from China Foreign Affairs University

There are two Diplomacy Priorities under One Belt One Road strategy(OBOR): diplomacy towards the great powers and diplomacy towards neighboring countries. Neighboring diplomacy obviously has more potential for improvement than diplomacy towards America. In his visit to Singapore in November 2015, President Xi Jinping expounded clearly that neighborhood will be first important for overall Chinese diplomacy, and China will take the duty of prompting neighboring peace, stabilization and development. Xi also declared that neighboring countries will benefit from OBOR and become the chief cooperative partners of China. After reviewing Chinese diplomacy in 2015, the first year of OBOR enforcement, people can find that the gravity of Chinese diplomacy was turning from great powers, especially the U.S., to neighboring countries. Its diplomacy towards the great powers including the U.S., will relatively decline. China, now identifying itself as a comprehensive great power, will try to make a balancing diplomacy among great powers comparing to the before when the U.S. is the core of the core of Chinese diplomacy(中国外交的重中之重). Neighboring diplomacy is moving to the center of Chinese diplomacy.

Based on the fact that the huge difference and large number of neighboring countries, China has to work out a conception on how to tackle with each of them.

The category of neighboring countries

 Neighboring countries refer to those who are located in the eastwards of Ural Mountains, Bosporus Strait and the Suez Canal, the southwards of Caucasus Mountains and the west of the Bering Sea. There are 63, which implies that China should not,and can not, conduct an equidistant diplomacy.

Since the reform and openness, China pursued the principle of non-alignment continuously and devoted major efforts to carry out partnership diplomacy.

To date, there are about 67 countries and 5 international organizations which have become partners of China. However, partner countries belongs different category, so it is necessary for China to sort its 62 neighboring countries reasonably and then define the level, strength, pattern and field of diplomacy policy towards these countries.

Neighboring area can be divided into some sub-regions: Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea and Mongolia), Southeast Asia (divided into two parts : the countries on the Indochina Peninsula  including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Thailand and the islands countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines, Indonesia and East Timor), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Kingdom of Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives), West Asia (the 6 countries of Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, Palestine, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and other 11 Pacific Islands countries).

According to their comprehensive power and relations with China, these countries could be divided into 4 main categories: sub-regional great powers(SGP), sub-regional secondary great powers(SSGP), sub-regional small and middle powers with close relations with China(SSCC) ,and other sub-regional small and middle powers(SSMP).

SGP include Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Kazakhstan and Australia. Russia is the sub-regional great power in North Asia, which will be specially discussed later. SSGP include Thailand, South Korea, Uzbekistan, New Zealand, Malaysia and Pakistan. The DPRK, Papua New Guinea, Turkmenistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Singapore should be categorized as SSCC. The rest belongs to SSMP.The following countries will not be discussed in this paper: countries from West Asia and South Caucasus

The conception for neighboring diplomacy

Given the unstable political situation along many silk road countries and  OBOR is a long term strategy, China, besides inter-government relation, must develop the ties with various parties in those countries, and pay attention to public diplomacy as well. China can learn a lot from Japan, the U.S. and European countries.

China needs to keep in mind that program/projects for cooperation should be proposed by silk road countries. China only chooses some of them for cooperation. An active China with hundred of program/project proposals will scare those countries and cause many unexpected results. Besides that, China also needs to conduct different diplomacy according to the category they belong to.

The principle for SGP is “cooperation with balance”. SGPs are often inclined to become global powers and worry about China’s influence in its region. To balance China, they will like to develop a close tie with a  global power (say, the U.S.). The U.S., as a unique superpower, will be sure enough to take them as tools of balancing China in Asia as a whole.

“Being a balancer” is an iron-clad rule practiced by different hegemonies in the past centuries. What doesn’t China borrow the rule?

China should conduct the rule in different ways to different SGP according to their relations with China and America respectively, that is, counterbalance supplemented by cooperation towards Japan and India, cooperation supplemented by counterbalance towards Kazakhstan and Indonesia, half  each of counterbalance and cooperation towards Vietnam and Australia.

For SSGP, China should conduct “sincere support with limitation”. Facing strategic pressure from SGP, SSGPs need strategic support from China. China should support these countries sincerely and strongly with a limitation of its partner, not an ally.

For SSCC, China should carry out “whole support without guarantee”. A few SSCCs are good at handling their relations with different global powers and find the most beneficial status for themselves. Most SSCCs do not mind to rely heavily on China, especially in regards to develop economy development and infrastructure building. Besides infrastructure construction, China should lay importance to improve their soft capabilities such as legal system, medical condition, education.

For SSMP, China needs to take the principle of “cooperation limited to some fields and ways”. For those echoing OBOR positively, China should show sincere support through some program/projects proposed by them ,based on careful evaluation. Some of them may become SSCC-like  partners.For those echoing OBOR not very positive, China should strictly evaluate programs/projects proposed by them and only choose some with low risks. As to those hostile towards OBOR, China may let it(them?) be. In sum, OBOR will last for at least 8 years, China must keep enough patience for its enforcement. Quality is prior to speed.

Diplomacy Towards Pivot Countries

To enforce OBOR effectively, China needs to find some pivot countries, which refer to those having strong strategic tie with China and probably growing up the model of OBOR. They are mainly from SSGP, secondarily from SSCC. Neighboring diplomacy should propel the process. Pakistan, the only all-round partnership with 200 million of population, is one of best candidates of pivot countries. Even so, programs/projects for cooperation must go through feasible evaluation. China should slow down a bit of investment in the country. Many failed programs will no doubt do harm to bilateral relations and OBOR as well. Thailand，Malaysia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea are candidates too. Uzbekistan is in question however.

I will argue that  it is Bangladesh, rather than Sri Lanka and  Myanmar, will grow up a pivot country. Based on intensive bilateral military cooperation, solid political relations(perhaps only next to Sino-Pakistani relations in South Asia) and economic complementarity, China and Bangladesh may expect a rapid and huge increase of bilateral cooperation.

According to my analytical framework,Indonesia and Kazakhstan are impossible to be pivot countries, though both are enthusiastic to OBOR. They have dynamics to work out ceilings of bilateral political and economic cooperation. However, pivot fields for cooperation are alternatives.

Diplomacy Towards Russia

Russia is the most important one in China’s neighboring diplomacy. Russia plays an irreplaceable role on national security of China, international strategic collaberation, bilateral military cooperation, bilateral energy cooperation, economic corridor and land bridge construction. Thus, some Chinese scholars advocate to re-build Sino- Russia alliance. I will say nay to the idea. Russia always fails to maintain stable relations with the U.S. and Europe;it keeps strategic prevention to China in many ways; its civil technology, economic structure and GDP  is far behind China.

If China and Russia form an alliance, China’s loss will obviously surpass China’s gains.  Russia will dominate bilateral military cooperation while become China’s burden, economically, technically. The United States, together with its allies, will shift its China policy from engagement with prevention to total prevention. That will be a disaster for China’s foreign trade, inward/outward investment, technology import, international education exchange, etc.  Many silk road countries will hesitate to join international institutions led by China.

Russia always views itself as a part of western world and keeps its main economic and cultural link with western world. Putin also expresses many times that it is impossible to form any formal military alliance with China.

Sino-Russian relations should benefit the OBOR and China’s peaceful rising. Generally speaking, Sino-US relations prevail to Sino-Russia relations, though Russia is so important for China’s neighboring diplomacy.