It is China’s Time Window for

A New South China Sea Policy

XUE Li

 Professor for Institute of World Economics and Politics, CASS

CHENG  Zhangxi 

PHD. University of St Andrews

The South China Sea(SCS) issue has now arrived at a critical point, China should take the advantages of this opportunity to adjust its South China Sea approach – to steer from “unilateral win” formula  to “multilateral win” formula, so as to take lead in the problem solving process. This new approach should be driving the South China Sea problem solving process to a faster track, clearing out major obstacles in building Southeast Asian Hub for 21th Century Maritime Silk Road(MSR).

Based on different opinions on island and reef ownerships and maritime interests/rights, the claimant parties of the South China Sea issue fall into two groups: mainland China and China-Taiwan, and the four ASEAN claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines,Malaysia and Brunei). The majority of the ASEAN non-claimants,along with some of the outsiders led by European countries, the United States, Japan and Australia, as the case stands, support the claims made by the ASEAN claimants, whereas a minority of the ASEAN non-claimants, Russia, South Korea and some other outsiders stand neutral. Although there also are some disputes between the ASEAN claimants themselves about ownerships of the islands and maritime interests/rights, these disputes are temporarily considered 'minor' in the face of their confrontation with China.

At the moment, the South China Sea issue is in a relatively peaceful period, but over years of development, it has already been shaped into a trifold game between China and the United States, China and the ASEAN claimants, and China and the ASEAN as a whole. Amongst which, the game between China and the United States is the major conflict, the game that the ASEAN claimants using ASEAN against China is increasingly tense. On the basis that the South China Sea issue is already a short-board in the China-ASEAN relations, it is considered an indicator to China's foreign policies, as well a major tool to the United States' Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy. China calls for weakening the South China Sea issue whilst strengthening political, economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries, but the outcomes so far are barely visible. The South China Sea issue is also a key security question to the ASEAN countries, they regard this as a touchstone to the ASEAN security cooperation.

The ASEAN countries believe that China has become increasingly assertive regarding the South China Sea issue over the past few years. Along with China's rise, this puts them in an even more disadvantageous position. As a response, the ASEAN countries propelled the internationalisation of the South China Sea issue and became more reliant on the United States and other foreign countries to deal with their security concerns. It is not hard to see that only when China and the ASEAN agree on a binding working framework, will the ASEAN claimants then begin economic and cultural cooperation with China, and maybe venture attempts to strengthen security cooperation as well.

It is highly unlikely to see the South China Sea issue resolved in short stage. However, the South China Sea issue may not necessarily get in the way of promoting cooperation between China and the ASEAN claimants. Of course, this requires a relatively more relaxed external environment and an easier internal environment. External environment mainly concerns the degree of intervention made by the outside countries (major powers). Internal environment on the other hand, mainly refers to the domestic political stance of the ASEAN claimants and as a result of which, the political relationships between these countries.

External Environment

Considering that populism and the anti-globalisation trend have made developed countries less concerned about issues that appeared in foreign regions, this have forged a relatively relaxed external environment for resolving the South China Sea issue. Japan, the European Union, India and Russia form the major external power, with the United States taking the lead.

The Asia-Pacific region is in no doubt one of the United States' most concerned area. As an experienced hegemon, the United States is well aware that it has to give way to China's rise, but in the meantime, it is also hoping to slow down this process, as well as to increase the cost of the rise of China's maritime power. In order to achieve as such, the Obama administration shifted its military deployment to the Second Island Chain, strengthened the mobility of the Frist Island Chain, and urged its allies and partners to make further input so as to form an 'arc line' to counterbalance China. Whereas the new Trump administration, whilst calling for "make America great again" and emphasising "America first", is likely to place more stress on domestic development and demand more responsibilities from other countries.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration will be continuously counterbalancing China, but in practice, it might adopt a more tier structured approach (e.g. prioritising the DPRK nuclear issue first, and then the East China Sea issue, the Taiwan issue, then the South China Sea issue and so on) rather than carry on the 'arc line' strategy (from the northern Kamchatka Peninsula to Darwin, Australia) employed by the Obama administration.

If 'core interest' is considered as brain to the human body, the freedom of navigation is,  though critical for  the US Navy, obviously not the United States' core interest. The key to the United States Navy's freedom of navigation is the right to military activities (including the intelligence gathering) within other countries’ exclusive economic zones and territorial seas. To this end, the United States defined the freedom of navigation in its own favour after the Second World War and promoted its stand with its much superior naval power. The reason behind the establishment of the Freedom of Navigation Program in 1979 is to continuously promote the United States' maritime claims through using its own domestic laws and regulations after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea takes effect, and to challenge what the United States regards as "excessive maritime claims".

The freedom of navigation program in practice is to carry out Freedom of Navigation Operational Assertion (FONOP), regardless of the territories of allies or opponents. The South China Sea is a major area to carry out FONOP, but it is not the only one. On this ground, FONOP in the South China Sea is more of a bargaining chip, just like FONOP in the Black Sea during the Cold War. Furthermore, after the United States lost its 'Filipino arm' when president Duterte scaled back the Military cooperation with the United States, the significance of the FONOP is also greatly reduced.

Internal Environment

The South China Sea issue involves five countries and six parties: Mainland China, China-Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Six ASEAN countries are non-claimants. Of which, Indonesia and Singapore are more influential over the South China Sea issue.

ASEAN Non-Claimants

Even though Indonesia is not one of the claimants, there are about 50,000 square kilometres of exclusive economic zone north of its Natuna Islands situated within the South China Sea dotted line (Nine-Dash Line), hence an overlapping area with China. In order to strengthen its claim, not only has Indonesia been sending immigrants to the Natuna Islands for the past twenty years or so, in recent times, it also made military deployment to Natuna Islands. Overall, Indonesia seems to be more discrete and realistic about the South China Sea issue.

Since Joko took presidencyin 2014, he put forward a vision for Indonesia as "global maritime falcrum". With the willingness to promote economic development, he pledged his support to the Belt and Road Initiative. China on the other hand, is also regarding Indonesia as one of the key players in the Belt and Road building. At this stage, China-Indonesia cooperation has been continuously deepening. More to the point, president Joko announced publicly in his 2014 election campaign that the South China Sea issue is so complicated that he would not to pay much attention to it unless a good recipe emerges. So he will probably keep a sound relationship with China except his re-election campaign in 2019, Joko might play a stronger hand at the issue in view to beat his Muslim conservative rival headed by Prabowo.

On the basis that Singapore is the only developed country of the ASEAN members, with a high dependency on sea trade, it is committed to promote ASEAN integration and play 'the chief of staff' role. Over the South China Sea issue, Singapore is keen on acting strong against China. This, in the past few years, has inevitably led to the turbulences in the China-Singapore relationship. However, given that Singapore's economy is highly compatible with China, neither has it the ability nor the intention to openly confront China. Vietnam and the Philippines' perspective not to publically confront China, in the meanwhile, are also holding back Singapore's ambition. These together indicate that Singapore will not conduct a radical SCS policy in the near future.

ASEAN Claimants

Of the four ASEAN claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines clearly have more disagreement with China, and they advocate a multilateral framework to solve the issue. The Philippines in the past, even attempted to raise its voice and benefit through third-party arbitration (as seen in the South China Sea Arbitration). Malaysia and Brunei in contrast, are more settled about the South China Sea issue. Politically, they are more prone to a bilateral framework to solve the issue, managing differences and promoting cooperation.

Vietnam

As all know, there are two groups of political elites within the Vietnamese government – the Southern Clique and the Northern Clique. Whilst the new Vietnamese government is mainly formed by the Northern Clique, which by and large, is China-friendly, China and Vietnam are likely to maintain a relatively friendly relationship before 2021. As history suggests, the delimitation of land and Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin)are all achieved under friendly circumstances. In this sense, Vietnam and China stand a good chance in coming to some common understanding over the South China Sea issue with this Vietnamese government.

The Philippines

The South China Sea policy adopted by former president Aquino III has driven China-Philippines relationship to a bottom period, and directly caused “globalization” of SCS dispute. After president Duterte's inauguration in 2016, the Philippines' revised SCS policy has made great improvement to China-Philippines relationship. At present, China-Philippines relationship is no less optimistic than the Arroyo period, and the impact of SCS issue is kept to a minimum. Until the next presidential election due in 2022, president Duterte is very likely to continue this friendly approach, and limit the  impact of SCS issue to bilateral relations.

Malaysia

Since Naguib came to power in 2009, China-Malaysia relation stepped into the best time in history. He insists on dealing SCS issue through a bilateral framework, and quietly resolved the recent Luconia Breakers dispute rather than the previous prime ministers who set foot on the Swallow Reef to claim ownership. At the moment, Naguib is most likely to continue his premiership for another 4 years after the next election.

Brunei

There is an obvious increase in economic cooperation between China and Brunei In recent years. In regard to the idea of jointly development of offshore oil and gas resources, Brunei holds a positive attitude and co-signed a Joint Declaration with China in 2013. Given that this joint development was hugely delayed due to Malaysia's objection, a commonly understood solution to the South China Sea issue is in no doubt in Brunei's favour.

China-Taiwan

China-Taiwan's South China Sea stand mainly comes from the South China Sea Policy Agenda established in 1993, which clearly stated that the water within the Nine-Dash Line is its "historic waters". Although China-Taiwan is very unlikely to have a seat on the negotiation table over the South China Sea issue, the possibility to carry on cooperation with the ASEAN countries is concerned nonetheless. As a die-hard promoter of “independent Taiwan”, Tsai Ing-wen will be less concerned about the South China Sea issue than Ma Ying-jeou.

Mainland China

Xi Jinping might be the most powerful leader after Mao Ze Dong. Whilst he is fully capable of making and implementing major foreign policies (e.g. the Belt and Road Initiative),the key is in the need for such foreign policy.

Reason One, the Belt and Road Initiative is a top-level design of foreign relations determined by the new Chinese government. Centring on economic development, it emphasises on infrastructure and manufacturing industry, and expands to the North, the West, the South of China, and to the African continent. In the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has shown the leadership and responsibility of a great power to some extent, but at the same time, it also should realise that there still are political, security and cultural differences slowing down the process.

Reason Two, as the biggest coastal country of the South China Sea, China is obliged to come up with a multilateral winning plan to sort out SCS issue and take lead in the process. Other claimants do not have such capacity. At present, China is swinging between  “protecting rights first” and “keeping SCS stability first”.The former focuses on China's own national interests rather than those of the other claimants. Whereas latter mainly grabs the point of controlling differences, so as to keep the impact of the South China Sea issue to a minimum and carry on cooperation in other aspects. Given that both of these ideas are based on a unilateral win ground, they neither facilitate the avoidance of a tense situation, nor help resolving the fundamental issue.

Reason Three, in addition to promoting economic cooperation with its neighbouring countries, China, as a rising great power, should also take into consideration their security concerns and gain their trust in cooperation with China. Otherwise, China will see its neighbouring countries turn to other countries. The SCS dispute is the most important regional security issue for  ASEAN countries.

Reason Four,  the SCS dispute has already got in the way of the building of the Southeast Asian hub of MSR. Not only did it sabotage the enthusiasm of the ASEAN claimants, but also wounded the participation of the ASEAN non-claimants. It is the main reason why Vietnam continuously replied that it "does not understand the situation,has to further observe" to the Belt and Road Initiative. The South China Sea issue is now like an 'infection' to the China-ASEAN relationship, and the treatment to this is a binding multilateral working framework.

Reason Five, based on the above discussion, both the external environment and internal environment to resolving the South China Sea issue are in China's favour at the moment. Should China miss this time window, there is a good chance that this 'infection'  will flare up once again with just a minimal touch.

Concluding Remarks

According to the above analysis, the next few years provide a sound time window for the claimants to work together to push forward a solution to the South China Sea issue. Rather than settling in this seemingly peaceful situation, China should take this opportunity to initiate a new approach to the South China Sea issue so as to take lead in the problem solving process and fundamentally end this passive situation. The key to this new approach should be the idea of win-win, which is a comprehensive plan to resolve the South China Sea issue. Not only is this China's obligation as a rising great power, but also the solution to the security concerns of the Southeast Asian countries, as well as the drive to the building of the Southeast Asian  hub of MSR.

To visit the published copy（http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/chinas-window-of-opportunity-in-the-south-china-sea/）